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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY-POWER OF TRIAL 
CouRT TO UsE ADDITUR-The plaintiff brought suit against two defendants, 
claiming $56,000 for personal injuries suffered in an accident. Upon return 
of a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $3,000, the plaintiff 
moved for a new trial on the issue of damages. The trial court denied the 
motion on condition that defendants consent to the entry of a judgment 
of $9,830.92. Both defendants consented. Plaintiff appealed on the ground 
that the use of an additur constituted an infringement of his constitution-
al guarantee of a jury trial. Held, affirmed. Conditioning the denial of a 
new trial upon the defendant's consent to an increase in the judgment 
does not violate the Minnesota state constitution which states that the 
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.1 Genzel v. Halvorson, (Minn. 
1957) 80 N.W. (2d) 854. 
Most American jurisdictions allow a trial court to deny a new trial 
on condition that the plaintiff agrees to a remission of the excess damages 
above an amount which the court considers reasonable.2 This procedure 
l MINN. CoNsr., art l, §4. 
2 Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1888); Gila Valley Ry. 
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is called remittitur. Its advantage is elimination of the delays and costs 
to litigants which are inherent in a new trial. Courts have been almost 
unanimous in finding that this process does not infringe the guarantee 
of jury trial in the Seventh Amendment of the Federal Constitution3 or 
in similar provisions of state constitutions.4 Conditioning the denial of a 
new trial upon the defendant's acceptance of increased damages is known 
as additur. Although additur would appear to be analogous to remittitur, 
the United States Supreme Court ruled in Dimick v. Schiedt5 that its use 
in a federal court violates the Seventh Amendment which provides that 
"no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."6 Since 
the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated into the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Dimick v. Schiedt applies only to 
federal courts.7 State constitutions ordinarily do not contain provisions 
similar to the Seventh Amendment but simply provide that the right to a 
Co. v. Hall, 13 Ariz. 270, 112 P. 845 (1911), affd. 232 U.S. 94 (1914); Hepner v. Libby, 
McNeill and Libby, 114 Cal. App. 747, 300 P. 830 (1931); Noxon v. Remington, 78 Conn. 
296, 61 A. 963 (1905); Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa 329, 177 N.W. 65 (1920). 
3 Blunt v. Little, (C.C. Mass. 1822) 3 Fed. Cas. 760, No. 1,578; Arkansas Valley Land 
and Cattle Co. v. Mann, note 2 supra. 
4 Alabama Power Co. v. Talmadge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 S. 548 (1921); Sewell v. Sewell, 
91 Fla. 982, 109 S. 98 (1926); Burdict v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 123 Mo. 221, 27 S.W. 
453 (1894); Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N.M. 541, 191 P. 442 (1919). Contra, Louisville & 
Nashville Ry. Co. v. Earl, 94 Ky. 368, 22 S.W. 607 (1893). A few states permit remittitur 
only when the amount of the excess can be exactly computed. City of East Point v. 
Christian, 40 Ga. App. 81, 149 S.E. 50 (1929). 
5 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
6 U.S. CoNsr., Amend. VII. The majority felt that this provision invalidated prac-
tices which had not been sanctioned in the English common law courts prior to I 791. 
Dimick v. Schiedt, note 5 supra, at 488. There is some dispute as to whether the majority 
of the Court was correct in concluding that the English practice did not recognize 
additur. See note 13 infra and authorities cited therein. Justice Stone dissented on the 
ground that the Seventh Amendment did not attempt to prescribe any particular pro-
cedure by which the trial of facts was to be obtained. Dimick v. Schiedt, note 5 supra, 
at 491. Earlier Supreme Court decisions had appeared to support his view by recogniz-
ing procedures which were not known in the English common law courts. See Walker v. 
N.M. and S. Pac. Ry. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897), in which a federal court set aside a 
general verdict on the basis of facts found in a special verdict. In Ex parte Peterson, 
253 U.S. 300 (1920), the Court sustained the appointment of auditors as an aid to the 
jury in arriving at its verdict. See also Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 
283 U.S. 494 (1931), sustaining the constitutionality of partial new trials. These cases 
may be distinguished on the ground that none of these procedures actually prevents 
a jury from making a finding of fact in the way that an additur does. Recent federal 
cases have shown a tendency to ignore the rule of Dimick v. Schicdt. See United States 
v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield Assn., (5th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 830, cert. den. 306 U.S. 
646 (1939), limiting the rule to cases where the trial court had committed some other 
error which would demand that a new trial be given; Cummings v. Boston & M. Ry. Co., 
(1st Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 133. See also Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, (D.C. N.J. 1957) 152 
F. Supp. 486, where the court held that the $8,300 limitation on damages provided 
by the Warsaw Convention did not violate the Seventh Amendment. Dimick v. Schiedt 
was not cited. 
7 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877). 
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jury trial shall remain inviolate.8 In the principal case the Minnesota 
court ruled that this difference in wording permitted an additur under 
the state constitution.9 While a growing body of decisions favors this in-
terpretation,10 most states that have considered the problem have reached 
the opposite conclusion.11 Courts in these latter cases have argued that the 
trial by jury guaranteed is a trial according to common law principles 
which preclude the use of an additur.12 This argument seems weak since 
there is some indication that the additur practice was used by the early 
English common law courts.13 In any event, there is little reason to assume 
that the drafters of the various state constitutions intended to restrict 
trial procedure to that practiced in the common law courts of England 
prior to 1791,14 or in their state courts at the time when the state con-
stitutions were enacted.HI Not so easily dismissed are the arguments that a 
s Clauses prohibiting reexamination by methods differing from those known at 
common law are found in ORE. CONST., art. I, §17, and W. VA. CONST., art. 3, §13. 
Louisiana is the only state which has no constitutional guaranty of jury trial in civil 
cases. 
9 It is this difference in the language of the federal and state constitutions which 
has enabled state courts to render judgments non obstante verdicto when a directed 
verdict has been improperly refused below, although this procedure has been invalidated 
in the federal courts under the Seventh Amendment. See Wayland v. Latham, 89 Cal. 
App. 55, 264 P. 766 (1928); Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 215 Mass. 467, 102 
N.E. 665 (1913); Vandenberg v. Kaat, 252 Mich. 187, 233 N.W. 220 (1930); 38 YALE 
L. J. 971 (1929). 
10 Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 P. 573 (1924); Gaffney v. Illingsworth, 
90 N.J.L. 490, 101 A. 243 (1917). See Morrell v. Gobeil, 84 N.H. 150, 147 A. 413 (1929) 
(apparently assuming that additur is constitutional); Markota v. East Ohio Gas Co., 154 
Ohio St. 546, 97 N.E. (2d) 13 (1951). Some courts will allow additur when the damages 
are liquidated or can be easily ascertained. See Yep Hong v. Williams, 6 Ill. App. (2d) 
456, 128 N.E. (2d) 655 (1955); Rudnick v. Jacobs, 9 W.W. Harr. (39 Del.) 169, 197 A. 
381 (1938); 95 A.L.R. 1163 (1935). 
11 Lorf v. Detroit, 145 Mich. 265, 108 N.W. 661 (1906); Raymond L.J. Riling, Inc. 
v. Schuck, 346 Pa. 169, 29 A. (2d) 693 (1943); Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. (2d) 350, 240 P. 
(2d) 604 (1952); 95 A,L.R. 1163 (1935). 
12 Dorsey v. Barba, note 11 supra. It is difficult to determine whether the court 
felt that the procedure which must ,be followed by a trial court is that which the English 
courts used in 1791, or that which was in use in California at the time when the state 
constitution was enacted. 
13 A court upon viewing a wound might grant extra damages. BuLI.ER's NISI Pruus 
21 (1806); MAYNE, TREATISE ON DAMAGES, 9th ed., 571 (1920); SAYER, ,LAw OF DAMAGES 
173 (1792). Cf. Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 244, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (1764). It 
is possible that this practice had fallen into disuse in England prior to 1791. See Carlin, 
"Remittiturs and Additurs," 49 W. VA. L. Q. I (1942). 
14 The failure of state constitutions to follow the language of the Seventh Amend-
ment may indicate a desire to avoid restricting the right to a jury trial to those pro-
cedures which were known prior to 1791. See dissenting opinion of Traynor, J., in 
Dorsey v. Barba, note 11 supra, at 614. The state court decisions sanctioning judgment 
non obstante verdicto support this conclusion. 
15 It is extremely difficult to determine whether the guarantees of a trial by jury 
in the state constitutions were intended to restrict state courts to those procedures in 
common use at the time when the state constitution was ratified. See Hickman v. £alti-
more & Ohio Ry., 30 W. Va. 296, 4 S.E. 654 (1887); Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 
214 N.W. 374 (1927) so holding. Most decisions do not deal with the question of whether 
additur or remittitur were in common use at the time when the particular state con-
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remittitur differs from an additur in that the jury, although awarding an 
erroneously excessive verdict, has approved the amount to which damages 
are reduced, while an additur results in damages beyond the scope of the 
jury verdict;16 and that plaintiff may be injured by an additur if he is 
forced to accept less than the maximum amount which a jury might have 
granted on a retrial.17 The Minnesota court dismissed these problems, 
observing that the plaintiff would be able to appeal if the trial judge 
should fix the damages at a figure which was wholly inadequate as a matter 
of law.18 A Possible alternative to the Minnesota procedure would be to 
give the defendant a choice between accepting a new trial and paying the 
maximum damages which a jury would be permitted to find as is done in 
New York.19 Since a larger jury verdict for him would be set aside, the 
plaintiff would lose nothing by this procedure and since the defendant 
could elect a new trial, he would not be injured. However, since an ex-
tremely low verdict is often the result of a compromise, the jury finding 
liability only because it could also set low damages,20 it may be asked if 
the defendant would ever fail to gamble on the new trial with its possibility 
of a different result.21 If his alternative is to pay the maximum permissible 
damages, his only possible loss on a new trial is its cost to him, although 
this would undoubtedly be a deterrent in some cases.22 In any event the 
practice approved in the principal case, although expediting law suits, 
seems somewhat unjust. The court rules that the plaintiff has not been 
treated fairly by the jury, but requires him to forego the privilege of an-
other jury trial because the court and the defendant have agreed upon 
another way of settling the case. The maximum damage practice, though 
resulting in more new trials, better protects a plaintiff's rights. 
Robert W. Steele, S. Ed. 
stitution was enacted. See Carlin, "Remittiturs and Additurs," 49 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1942). 
It is noteworthy that additur had ,been sanctioned in one British court prior to the 
adoption of many American state constitutions. Armytage v. Haley, 4 Q.B. 917, 114 Eng. 
Rep. 1143 (1843). Similarly, remittitur had been used in American courts prior to the 
enactment of many state constitutions. See Dimick v. Schiedt, note 5 supra, at 484; 
and Dorsey v. Barba, note 11 supra. 
16 Yep Hong v. Williams, note IO supra, at 459. 
17 Lorf v. Detroit, note 11 supra, at 267. 
18 Principal case at 859. 
19 O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E. (2d) 883 (1956). A similar pro-
cedure is used in Wisconsin practice. A: new trial will be ordered unless the plaintiff 
consents to judgment for the smallest sum or the defendant consents to judgment for 
the greatest sum an impartial jury could reasonably award. Risch v. Lawhead, 211 
Wis. 270, 248 N.W. 127 (1933); Reuter v. Hickman, La!!son & Diener Co., 160 Wis. 
284, 151 N.W. 795 (1915). 
20 Cf. note, p. 117 of this issue. 
21 See 18 IowA L. REv. 404 (1933). 
22 It is quite possible too that the maximum damage figure set by the judge would 
still be less in practice than the highest jury verdict he would permit as reasonable, 
although the two figures would theoretically .be the same. 
